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ABSTRACT
Objective: To prevent wrong surgery, the WHO ‘Safe
Surgery Checklist’ was introduced in 2008. The
checklist comprises a time-out procedure (TOP): the
final step before the start of the surgical procedure
where the patient, surgical procedure and side/site are
reviewed by the surgical team. The aim of this study is
to evaluate the extent to which hospitals carry out the
TOP before anaesthesia in the operating room, whether
compliance has changed over time, and to determine
factors that are associated with compliance.
Design: Evaluation study involving observations.
Setting: Operating rooms of 2 academic, 4 teaching
and 12 general Dutch hospitals.
Participants: A random selection was made from all
adult patients scheduled for elective surgery on the day
of the observation, preferably involving different
surgeons and different procedures.
Results: Mean compliance with the TOP was 71.3%.
Large differences between hospitals were observed. No
linear trend was found in compliance during the study
period. Compliance at general and teaching hospitals
was higher than at academic hospitals. Compliance
decreased with the age of the patient, general surgery
showed lower compliance in comparison with other
specialties and compliance was higher when the team
was focused on the TOP.
Conclusions: Large differences in compliance with
the TOP were observed between participating hospitals
which can be attributed at least in part to the type of
hospital, surgical specialty and patient characteristics.
Hospitals do not comply consistently with national
guidelines to prevent wrong surgery and further
implementation as well as further research into non-
compliance is needed.
INTRODUCTION
Ideally, hospitals should be safe environ-
ments for their patients. However, making
errors is inherent in all humans.1 The report
‘To Err is Human’ showed that errors cause
44 000–98 000 deaths and over one million
injuries each year in American hospitals.1 As
a result, patient safety became a major topic
on the healthcare agenda.2–4 Patient safety
covers the prevention of errors and adverse
events associated with healthcare that affect
patients.5 An adverse event is unintentional
harm caused by healthcare management
rather than by the patient’s underlying
disease that results in a prolonged hospital
stay, temporary or permanent disability or
death.6 In 2004, adverse events occurred in
approximately 5.7% of hospital admissions in
the Netherlands: approximately 2.3% of the
adverse events were potentially preventable.6
More than 54% of the unintentional adverse
events were associated with the surgical pro-
cedure, of which 34% were reviewed as being
preventable.6 It is therefore important to
ensure and improve patient safety during
surgery.
Patient safety in surgery has several aspects.
One of these aspects is wrong surgery, which
can be classiﬁed into three groups: surgery at
the wrong site, surgery on the wrong patient
and carrying out the wrong procedure.7
Wrong site surgery occurs whenever a
planned surgical procedure is performed at
or on the wrong place, part and side or site.
Wrong patient surgery refers to a procedure
Strengths and limitations of this study
▪ Structured observations of compliance with
time-out procedure (TOP) and factors that are
associated with compliance at operating rooms
(ORs).
▪ The presence of the observer might have influ-
enced the behaviour of the OR staff.
▪ A potential selection bias in the surgical proce-
dures on the observation days may have
occurred. No outcome data are available.
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performed on the wrong patient. Wrong procedure
surgery refers to a different procedure being performed
than the one planned for the patient. The Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations ( JCAHO) sentinel event database ranked
wrong site surgery as the second most frequently
reported adverse event between 1995 and 2005.8 In the
USA, for instance, the estimated rate of wrong site
surgery ranges from 0.09 to 4.5/10 000 operations.3 8–13
To prevent wrong surgery, the JCAHO guideline
‘Universal protocol for Preventing Wrong Site, Wrong
Procedure, Wrong Person Surgery’ was adopted in 2003
by the Joint Commission in the USA.14 Consequently,
the WHO introduced a checklist in 2008 for worldwide
use, called the ‘Safe Surgery Checklist’. In 2009, the
WHO concluded that the use of a checklist in the oper-
ating room (OR) is associated with a signiﬁcant decrease
in postoperative complication (30%) and mortality rates
(50%).15 Based on these results, the WHO estimated
that implementing the checklist could save 500 000 lives
every year worldwide.15 Other studies provided evidence
supporting the use of surgical checklists as well.16–19 In
the Netherlands, the SURgical PAtient Safety System
(SURPASS) was developed with the same intention. It is
based on safety checks used in the aviation industry to
reduce human error.20 Research on the external valid-
ation of the SURPASS shows a reduction in uninten-
tional harm.21–23
Each of the checklists aforementioned comprises a
time-out procedure (TOP). Errors can be avoided by
including a preoperative discussion just before the start
of the surgical procedure. This takes place during a
time-out involving a review of the names and roles of all
team members, characteristics of the patient, the oper-
ation plan, familiarity with the procedure, the presence
of the correct materials/equipment and potential issues
for the patient.24 25 Although evidence is scarce, it is
likely that these TOPs reduce uncertainties in the OR
among the surgical team and reduce the risk of wrong
surgery. The TOP is the ﬁnal step before the start of the
surgical procedure and is therefore crucial in preventing
wrong surgery. A TOP is carried out just before anaesthe-
sia,26 and consists of three checks (the patient, the pro-
cedure and the side/site), all of equal importance in
preventing wrong surgery.
The aim of this study is to evaluate the extent to
which hospitals carry out the TOP before anaesthesia in
the OR, whether compliance has changed over time,
and to determine factors that are associated with the
TOP compliance. Insights into compliance with the
TOP and the factors associated with compliance are
important because they have the potential to improve
the TOP and reduce adverse events in surgical processes
throughout the world. This study was carried out in the
Netherlands and was part of a larger evaluation study of
the Dutch Hospital Patient Safety Program (hereinafter
‘Safety Program’) that was carried out during the ﬁnal
year of the programme (box 1).
On the basis of the goals of the Safety Program, it was
expected that the compliance with the TOP would
increase over time and would become more visible
during the ﬁnal year of the programme when hospitals
approached the public deadline at the end of 2012.
The research questions are:
1. To what extent do Dutch hospitals comply with the
TOP before anaesthesia in the OR?
2. How has the compliance with the TOP changed
during the ﬁnal year of the Safety Program?




This study was part of a larger evaluation study of the
Safety Program that was carried out between November
2011 and December 2012 in 18 Dutch hospitals (about
20% of all Dutch hospitals). Hospitals were randomly
selected using a stratiﬁed sample based on geographical
regions and hospital type. Two academic hospitals, four
teaching hospitals and 12 general hospitals were
included in this study. All hospitals consented to the
study and were informed about further practical issues.
Twelve observers participated in this study.
Inter-observer variability was not measured, but limited
by training of observers prior to the start of the observa-
tions. Moreover, regular feedback meetings were held
where observers exchanged experiences and discussed
how to deal with certain situations and observations at
the OR. A random selection was made from all adult
patients scheduled for elective surgery on the day of the
observation. This selection was made by the observers
who were instructed to attend as many different surger-
ies as possible while ensuring they were present in the
OR before the start of each surgery, which was essential
in order to be able to observe the TOP procedure. The
goal was to have 10 observation days per hospital at
intervals of 4–6 weeks, and to observe 6–10 surgical pro-
cedures per day, preferably involving different surgeons
Box 1 The Dutch Hospital Patient Safety Program.
The Dutch Hospital Patient Safety Program (Safety Program) was
set up in 2008 to reduce preventable unintentional adverse events
in Dutch hospitals by 50% by the end of 2012.26 The Safety
Program consisted of 10 patient safety themes and clinical guide-
lines were developed for each theme. Hospitals were given
5 years to implement these guidelines. One of the themes was
prevention of wrong surgery. There are several risk factors for
wrong surgery, for example, insufficient compliance, inadequate
identification and verification and bad preoperative planning.27 28
The Safety Program therefore instructed the participating Dutch
hospitals to implement several steps to decrease wrong surgery,
based on the SURPASS checklist. One of the steps is identifica-
tion and verification by means of a TOP consisting of checks on
the correct patient, correct side, and correct intervention.29
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and different procedures. One observer per surgical pro-
cedure evaluated whether the TOP was carried out
before anaesthesia, using a standardised recording form
that covered the various aspects of doing the TOP:
checking the patient, procedure, and side/site, attention
of the team (focus), completeness of the team, interrup-
tions, and several background variables such as the type
of surgical procedure, the patient’s age and sex. The OR
team was not aware of the exact subject matter of the
observation; the observer was instructed to introduce
the study in abstract terms, referring to it as a study
about the surgical process in general.
TOP compliance
The outcome measure was whether the TOP was done
correctly and was dichotomous (yes/no). This variable
was used to examine mean TOP compliance and the
changes in compliance during the study period. A
correct TOP consists of three checks: patient, procedure
and side/site. Since all three checks are equally import-
ant for preventing wrong surgery, the TOP was only
deemed correct when all three checks were performed.
Furthermore, during a TOP the entire OR team gathers
around the patient and the surgeon asks the patient
his/her name, the type of procedure and the side/site
of the procedure.
Four independent variables were included so that any
association with compliance could be determined. The
type of hospital was categorised into academic, teaching,
and general. In the Netherlands, teaching hospitals
provide specialised medical care and are committed to
training and education. The level of care can be charac-
terised as complex and lies between that of general hos-
pitals and academic centres. Hospital size was
operationalised as the number of beds in the hospital
(a continuous variable). Surgical specialty was added as
a categorical variable with general surgery as the refer-
ence category. Focus (yes/no) was included to measure
the degree to which the OR team was paying full atten-
tion to the TOP and was not performing any other activ-
ities during the TOP. In addition, the patient
characteristics ‘age’ and ‘sex’ were included as covari-
ates. Completeness of the team (yes/no) was added as
an explorative analysis. The complete team in this study
was seen as the group of persons that performed the
surgery on the patient. To be able to perform a TOP
correctly, the complete team was present during the
TOP. When this was not the case, meaning that one or
more persons joint the team after the TOP had been
completed, team completeness was scores as ‘no’.
Statistical analyses
Descriptive analyses were performed to obtain a picture
of the study population, mean TOP compliance,
changes in compliance over time, mean compliance for
the different hospital types, mean compliance for the
different surgical specialties, and the focus and com-
pleteness of the team during the TOP.
A multilevel logistic regression analysis with two levels
was used to determine whether TOP compliance
changed between the 10 measuring moments. Multilevel
analysis was chosen to correct for the fact that the surgi-
cal procedures are not independent from each other,
but clustered within hospitals. Time was modelled by
adding 10 indicator variables for the measurement
moments (removing the intercept from the model);
trends were tested using polynomial contrasts (to the
fourth order) to study changes over time. Variance and
intraclass correlations (ICCs) were calculated to assess
the clustering of TOP compliance at the hospital and
surgical procedure level. An ICC of 20% was seen as
moderate.30 The changes over time were also analysed
for the different hospital types to determine the relation-
ship between hospital type and the changes in TOP
compliance. Separate logistic multilevel analyses were
performed for each independent variable to analyse the
effects of the independent variables ‘hospital size’ and
‘surgical specialty’; this was necessary because not
enough units at the highest level (hospitals) were avail-
able to have more than one independent variable in a
model.30 There were not enough units at the highest
level (hospitals) to model the effect of hospital type on
the TOP score in the pooled analyses. Age and sex of
the patient were added as covariates in all analyses. All
descriptive analyses were performed using SPSS version
PASW Statistics V.18. The multilevel analyses were per-
formed using MlwiN V.2.24 (using PQL, second order,
unconstrained level 1 variance, and options).
RESULTS
Descriptive analyses
A total of 1281 surgical procedures were observed at the
participating hospitals. After patients younger than 18
were excluded, 1232 observations remained for analysis.
Ages ranged from 18 to 96. The gender distribution was
41.4% male, 53.8% female, and 4.8% not registered.
The range in types of surgical procedures was broad;
observers had been instructed to observe different pro-
cedures and observed surgical procedures of in total 13
different specialties. Mean compliance with the TOP
during the total study period was 71.3%. Descriptive ana-
lyses showed that TOP compliance did not improve
during the study period. There was a large spread
between hospitals: one of the hospitals never performed
the TOP correctly and two had mean compliance rates
higher than 90%. A low mean TOP compliance (48%)
was found at the ninth measuring moment for all the
participating hospitals. The academic hospitals had a
mean compliance rate of 42.1%, teaching hospitals
76.2% and general hospitals 73.9%. Differences between
specialties were shown to exist: trauma, gastroenterology
and hepatology and ear, nose and throat medicine
(ENT) had the highest compliance rates.
Anaesthesiology, cardiothoracic surgery and cosmetic
surgery had the lowest compliance rates. In 44% of the
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observations the team was not focused on the TOP and
in 56%, the team was incomplete.
Multilevel regression analyses
In the ﬁrst multilevel regression analysis, the changes in
TOP compliance were tested. The effect was statistically
signiﬁcant for the fourth-order polynomial (p<0.01),
meaning that TOP compliance was not linear but ﬂuctu-
ated over time and no clear trend was observed.
Furthermore, there were large differences between the
measuring moments and between individual hospitals
(see ﬁgure 1). The multilevel analysis shows that 44%
(ICC=44.01) of the total variance in TOP compliance
can be attributed to the differences between the individ-
ual hospitals. Adding hospital type to the analysis caused
the ICC to drop to 40.11 (40%; see table 1).
When correcting for age and sex of the patient, the
ICC dropped to 26% (ICC=26.58). The relationship
between the age of the patient and the TOP was found
to be signiﬁcant (p<0.05). This relationship was tested
and found to be linear. Based on the results described
above, there was no rationale to correct for time (meas-
urement moments) in further analyses. Observations
from the different measurement moments were pooled
in the remaining analyses.
Separate analyses were performed for the independ-
ent variables ‘hospital size’, ‘surgical specialty’, and
‘focus’. No statistically signiﬁcant relationship was found
between hospital size and TOP compliance (data not
shown in tables). A positive relationship was found
between patients undergoing ENT surgery and the TOP
(reference=general surgery; p<0.01). Another positive
relationship was found between patients undergoing
ophthalmic surgery and the TOP (reference=general
surgery; p<0.05; see table 2). This indicates that TOP
compliance is signiﬁcantly higher in patients undergo-
ing ENT surgery or ophthalmic surgery compared with
patients undergoing general surgery. The relationship
between the age of the patient and TOP compliance was
found to be signiﬁcant (p<0.05) in all analyses. This
indicates that TOP compliance decreases with the
patient age. The TOP is performed correctly less often
for older patients. An additional analysis was performed
based on these results to determine which of the three
individual checks of the TOP attributed most to the
negative relationship between the age of the patient and
TOP compliance. Table 3 shows the results of the add-
itional analysis. The check procedure contributes most
to the negative relationship between age of the patient
and TOP compliance, this check is more often skipped
when an older patient is involved. The relationship
between the focus of the team during the TOP and the
correct execution of the TOP is shown in table 4. There
is a positive signiﬁcant relationship between focus and
TOP compliance, which indicates that the TOP is more
often correctly executed when the entire team is
focused on the TOP and not performing any other activ-
ities at the same time.
DISCUSSION
The objective of this study was to investigate the compli-
ance at Dutch hospitals with the national guidelines of a
TOP set by the Safety Program and how this changed
over the ﬁnal year of the programme. Furthermore, we
studied variables that might be associated with compli-
ance. This study found a mean TOP compliance of
71.3%. There was no linear trend in the TOP compli-
ance during the study period. Large differences were
found between and within individual hospitals, which
were partly inﬂuenced by age of the patient. The type of
hospital was associated with the TOP compliance: aca-
demic hospitals had lower compliance rates than
general and teaching hospitals. Given the low number of
academic hospitals in this study (N=2), these ﬁndings
cannot be generalised to academic hospitals as a whole.
ENT medicine and ophthalmological surgery had
higher TOP compliance than the reference group
(general surgery). No statistically signiﬁcant relationship
between TOP compliance and hospital size was found.
The TOP was correctly performed more often when the
OR team was focused on it. The negative relationship
Figure 1 Trend in the time-out
procedure compliance per
hospital type, and overall mean
(n=1232).
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Table 1 Trend in the time-out procedure per hospital type (n=1232; 18 hospitals)
Trend overall Trend per hospital type
General hospitals Teaching hospitals Academic hospitals
N Mean % 95% CI N Mean % 95% CI N Mean % 95% CI N Mean % 95% CI
Fixed effects
TOP (constant)
MM 1 121 73.52 53.20 to 87.14 85 85.18 2.00 to 94.35 25 59.00 21.26 to 88.46 11 16.48 0.91 to 80.91
MM 2 137 71.64 51.26 to 85.85 91 76.73 54.48 to 90.09 33 75.65 36.60 to 94.36 13 45.91 2.90 to 96.02
MM 3 134 66.79 45.78 to 82.73 87 67.09 42.94 to 84.66 33 82.19 44.85 to 96.32 14 23.86 1.55 to 86.19
MM 4 118 76.77 57.01 to 89.17 75 82.01 60.92 to 93.02 27 80.40 41.08 to 96.02 16 25.73 1.76 to 87.03
MM 5 125 77.26 57.99 to 89.32 85 87.56 70.27 to 95.44 30 72.30 32.65 to 93.36 10 5.97 0.29 to 57.90
MM 6 127 82.18 64.73 to 92.05 85 81.27 60.55 to 92.46 27 94.63 65.68 to 99.39 15 59.61 5.32 to 97.48
MM 7 114 81.20 62.89 to 91.67 78 82.23 61.44 to 93.07 26 91.13 57.87 to 98.72 10 46.67 2.40 to 96.89
MM 8 112 79.41 60.46 to 90.68 82 82.59 62.33 to 93.16 22 85.56 46.93 to 97.54 8 45.42 1.80 to 97.43
MM 9 129 48.44 28.65 to 68.74 89 52.86 29.81 to 74.75 25 66.00 26.36 to 91.33 15 6.00 0.40 to 50.29




Hospital (level 2) 2.591 (0.916)* 2.203 (0.798)*
Surgical procedure (level 1) 0.988 (0.040) 0.984 (0.040)
*p < 0.05.
Raw data for the remaining variables (specialty, focus and individual checks) is available with the author on request.
































between age of the patient and the TOP indicates that
higher patient age is associated with lower TOP compli-
ance. Of all the observed TOPs, 44% were performed
without the focus of the entire team, and the team was
not complete in 56% of the TOPs.
A wide range in compliance rates for surgical check-
lists can be found in previous studies, ranging from 12%
to 99% with a mean of 75%.31–33 The compliance rate
(71.3%) found in our study is slightly lower than the
mean rate found in other studies.
We found a difference in TOP compliance between
the different types of hospitals. The general and teach-
ing hospitals hardly differed from each other, which is
interesting because a previous study34 found teaching
hospitals to be better at implementing checklists than
general hospitals. According to the organisational learn-
ing theory, the availability of knowledge in an organisa-
tion contributes to the adoption of innovations.34 35
Teaching hospitals are learning environments, aimed at
spreading and developing knowledge; better compliance
can therefore be expected in teaching hospitals. We
found that academic hospitals showed lower TOP
compliance.
The literature is inconsistent about the inﬂuence of
hospital size on the use of checklists. Some argue that
larger hospitals are better developed and use standar-
dised processes, which increases the quality of the hos-
pital more often,36–38 whereas others conclude that
smaller hospitals implement checklists better.39 We
found no relationship between TOP compliance and
hospital size. The high ICC rates found in this study
suggest that the differences between individual hospitals
are high, and differences in compliance cannot be
explained by general hospital characteristics such as hos-
pital size. The differences between individual hospitals
need to be examined in further research, but possible
Table 2 Relationship between surgical specialties (n=1130; 18 hospitals) and compliance with the time-out procedure
Model 0 (time-out procedure+age+sex) Model 1 (model 0+specialties)
Fixed effects Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE)
Time out procedure (constant) 1.173 (0.268) 1.196 (0.269)
Specialties—general surgery – Reference
Specialties—gynecology – 0.050 (0.264)
Specialties—ENT – 0.905 (0.316)*
Specialties—ophthalmology – 0.616 (0.302)*
Specialties—orthopedic surgery – 0.163 (0.241)
Specialties—urology – 0.084 (0.287)
Specialties—other – 0.046 (0.279)
Patient age −0.011 (0.004)* −0.011 (0.004)*
Patient sex 0.064 (0.153) 0.074 (0.155)
Random effects
Variance components:
Intraclass correlation 25.331 25.499
Hospital (level 2) 1.116 (0.422)* 1.126 (0.426)*
Surgical procedure (level 1) 0.996 (0.042) 1.006 (0.043)
*p<0.05.
ENT, ear, nose and throat medicine.
Table 3 Age effects for the three different checks in the time-out procedure: checking the patient (n=1074), the procedure







Fixed effects Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE)
Check patient (constant) 3.499 (0.334) – –
Check procedure (constant) – 2.276 (0.282) –
Check side/site (constant) – – 2.739 (0.204)
Patient’s age 0.008 (0.008) −0.021 (0.006)* 0.012 (0.007)*
Patient’s sex −0.185 (0.288) 0.124 (0.198) 0.160 (0.246)
Random effects
Variance components:
Intraclass correlation 27.172 24.990 10.854
Hospital (level 2) 1.228 (0.623)* 1.096 (0.464)* 0.401 (0.236)*
Surgical procedure (level 1) 0.834 (0.036) 0.922 (0.040) 0.950 (0.041)
*p<0.05.
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explanations might be found in different organisational
structures, the creation of awareness among healthcare
staff and differences in speaking-up cultures between
hospitals.
The relationship found between surgical specialties
and the TOP is different from the results of previous
studies. One study showed a difference between sur-
geons and anesthesiologists40 and another study showed
no difference between surgical specialties at all.41 The
TOP is a standardised procedure, and the way in which
it should be carried out does not depend on the surgical
specialty performing the procedure or the patient
characteristics. Compliance with the TOP varied
between different specialties and was lowest among
general surgery teams. One explanation for these differ-
ences could be that not all medical disciplines and their
scientiﬁc communities have placed the same amount of
weight on a thorough implementation of the Safety
Program. If so, this could have had an inﬂuence on the
sense of urgency experienced by different specialties to
comply with TOP in their daily functioning. Further
research that includes specialty-speciﬁc factors is needed
to verify and deepen our ﬁndings. The negative relation-
ship between TOP compliance and the age of the
patient was an unexpected result, since the TOP should
be executed in the same way for all patients. In particu-
lar, the exact surgical procedure that would be carried
out was less often veriﬁed with elderly patients.
Explanations might be found in factors inherently asso-
ciated with the elderly patient themselves. For example,
elderly patients might be less able to verbally express
themselves to healthcare staff. On the other hand, expla-
nations might be found in factors that are associated
with the medical procedure itself. For example, the level
of standardisation of procedures that are commonly per-
formed in the elderly population (such as
hip-replacement surgery or cataract surgery) is relatively
high and it is unclear what effect this has on compliance
with TOP. Elderly people are a vulnerable group with a
higher risk of complications after surgery, therefore
further in-depth research is important to explain the dif-
ferences in compliance for different age groups.
Completeness and focus are important factors in the
TOP and performing it when team members are busy
with other activities creates a risk. Our study showed that
focus in the team contributes to the TOP being per-
formed correctly. However, there was poor focus on the
TOP in almost half of the surgical procedures observed.
Several possible causes could be underlying to poor
focus during the TOP, which was observed frequently in
our study. First, there could have been a lack of aware-
ness of the importance of the TOP among healthcare
staff. Regular emphasis on the importance of the TOP
during team meetings or during the joint brieﬁng at the
start of a new working day could help raise awareness.
Second, when surgery schedules are tight, healthcare
staff might experience time pressure. In trying to keep
up with the schedule and being efﬁcient, healthcare
staff might be tempted to perform multiple tasks simul-
taneously which in turn could negatively affect compli-
ance with TOP.
On the basis of these results, it seems that hospitals
still have a lot to gain by carrying out the TOP properly.
Qualitative research methods could provide insight into
the underlying reasons and incentives of why healthcare
staff perform the TOP in the way they currently do. This
type of research could complement and deepen the
ﬁndings that were presented in the current study.
Strengths and limitations
Our study was the ﬁrst to evaluate TOP compliance over
time through observations in the OR and look into the
factors associated with compliance. Our dependent vari-
able was a process indicator, because the incidence of
wrong surgery is too low to be observed with our study
design. Based on the literature, it seems fair to assume
that higher TOP compliance can contribute to a
decrease in the incidence of wrong surgery,15 although
this study gives no information about the actual number
of wrong surgeries and TOP compliance might not be
the only factor in the reduction of wrong surgery.
This study has several limitations. First, the presence
of the observer might have inﬂuenced the behaviour of
the OR staff and indirectly our dependent variable TOP.
Table 4 Relationship between focus (n=1074; 18 hospitals) during the time-out procedure and compliance with the time-out
procedure
Model 0 (time-out procedure+age+sex) Model 1 (model 0+focus)
Fixed effects Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE)
Time-out procedure (constant) 1.540 (0.163) 1.471 (0.156)
Focus – 0.567 (0.171)*
Patient’s age −0.006 (0.005) −0.005 (0.005)
Patient’s sex −0.012 (0.162) −0.016 (0.163)
Random effects
Variance components:
Intraclass correlation 8.971 7.991
Hospital (level 2) 0.324 (0.154)* 0.286 (0.140)*
Surgical procedure (level 1) 0.968 (0.042) 0.966 (0.042)
*p<0.05.
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However, the design of our study aimed to prevent this
potential observer bias, because the precise goal of the
observations was not known to the OR team. Second, a
potential selection bias can be found in the selection of
surgical procedures on the observation days. Surgical
procedures were selected based on practical considera-
tions: the day of the week, the duration of the procedure
and the OR schedule. The relationships found between
different specialisms might be partially overestimated,
because the same surgical teams were sometimes
observed on the same day or on different observation
days. However, the overall goal was to observe as may dif-
ferent surgical procedures with different teams as pos-
sible, in order to limit potential selection bias. Third,
there is no information available about the changes in
compliance during the ﬁrst period of the Safety
Program, and hospitals may have made progress during
this period.
CONCLUSIONS
The mean TOP compliance was 71.3% during the ﬁnal
year of the Safety Program and no improvement in com-
pliance over time was found. Large differences were
found between hospitals, and these differences were
inﬂuenced by age of the patient. Compliance was inﬂu-
enced by several factors: hospital type, surgical specialty,
age of the patient and focus of the team during the
TOP. Furthermore, in almost half the TOPs, the team
was not focused on the TOP or the team was incom-
plete. Despite the fact that almost three quarter of
operations are preceded by a TOP, hospitals need to
make an effort to improve TOP compliance and the way
in which the TOP is carried out in order to prevent
wrong surgery from happening in the future.
Author affiliations
1NIVEL—Netherlands Institute for Health Services Research, Utrecht,
The Netherlands
2Faculty Economics and Business, Department Operations, University of
Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands
3Departments of Sociology and Human Geography, Utrecht University,
Utrecht, The Netherlands
4Department of Public and Occupational Health, EMGO Institute for Health
and Care Research, Vrije Universiteit Medical Center (VUmc), Amsterdam, The
Netherlands
Acknowledgements The authors thank the participating hospitals, their
contact persons and employees who participated in our study.
Contributors SMvS and VK did the statistical analyses, interpreted the results
of the analyses and drafted the manuscript. SMvS took part in the data
collection. CdB was involved in the design of the study, organised the data
collection and critically revised the manuscript. PS did the statistical analyses
and reviewed the parts of the manuscript that involved the statistical analyses.
PPG was involved in the design of the study, advised on the statistical
analyses and critically revised the manuscript. CW was involved in the design
of the study and critically revised the manuscript. All the authors meet the
criteria for authorship, were involved in revising and approving the final
manuscript and accept responsibility for the data presented.
Funding This research was funded by the Dutch Hospital Safety Program and
he Ministry of Education, Culture and Science in the Netherlands.
Competing interests None.
Ethics approval The study protocol was granted approval by the VU
University Medical Center ethical review board in Amsterdam.
Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed.
Data sharing statement No additional data are available.
Open Access This is an Open Access article distributed in accordance with
the Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial (CC BY-NC 3.0) license,
which permits others to distribute, remix, adapt, build upon this work non-
commercially, and license their derivative works on different terms, provided
the original work is properly cited and the use is non-commercial. See: http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
REFERENCES
1. Kohn LT, Corrigan J, Donaldson MS. To err is human: building a
safer health system. 6th edn. Joseph Henry Press, 2000.
2. See LC, Chang YH, Chuang KL, et al. Animation program used to
encourage patients or family members to take an active role for
eliminating wrong-site, wrong-person, wrong-procedure surgeries:
preliminary evaluation. Int J Surg 2011;9:241–7.
3. Seiden SC, Barach P. Wrong-side/wrong-site, wrong-procedure, and
wrong-patient adverse events: are they preventable? Arch Surg
2006;141:931.
4. Zhan C, Kelley E, Yang HP, et al. Assessing patient safety in the
United States: challenges and opportunities. Med Care
2005;43:42–7.
5. WHO. Patient Safety. 2013. http://www.who.int
6. Zegers M, De Bruijne MC, Wagner C, et al. Adverse events and
potentially preventable deaths in Dutch hospitals: results of a
retrospective patient record review study. Qual Saf Health Care
2009;18:297–302.
7. Gibbs VC. Thinking in three’s: changing surgical patient safety
practices in the complex modern operating room. World J
Gastroenterol 2012;18:6712.
8. DeVine J, Chutkan N, Norvell DC, et al. Avoiding wrong site surgery:
a systematic review. Spine 2010;35:S28–36.
9. Ammerman JM, Ammerman MD, Dambrosia J, et al. A prospective
evaluation of the role for intraoperative x-ray in lumbar discectomy.
Predictors of incorrect level exposure. Surg Neurol 2006;66:470–3.
10. Kwaan MR, Studdert DM, Zinner MJ, et al. Incidence, patterns, and
prevention of wrong-site surgery. Arch Surg 2006;141:353.
11. Jhawar BS, Mitsis D, Duggal N. Wrong-sided and wrong-level
neurosurgery: a national survey. J Neurosurg Spine 2008;9:109.
12. Mody MG, Nourbakhsh A, Stahl DL, et al. The prevalence of wrong
level surgery among spine surgeons. Spine 2008;33:194.
13. Clarke JR, Johnston J, Finley ED. Getting surgery right. Ann Surg
2007;246:395.
14. Angle JF, Nemcek AA Jr, Cohen AM, et al. Quality improvement
guidelines for preventing wrong site, wrong procedure, and wrong
person errors: application of the joint commission “universal protocol
for preventing wrong site, wrong procedure, wrong person surgery”
to the practice of interventional radiology. J Vasc Interv Radiol
2009;20(7 Suppl):S256–62.
15. World Health Organization. New scientific evidence supports WHO
findings: a surgical safety checklist could save hundreds of
thousands of lives. 2011. http://www.who.int
16. Haynes AB, Weiser TG, Berry WR, et al. A surgical safety checklist
to reduce morbidity and mortality in a global population. N Eng J
Med 2009;360:491–9.
17. Mazzocco K, Petitti DB, Fong KT, et al. Surgical team behaviors and
patient outcomes. AM J Surg 2009;197:678–85.
18. Gawande AA, Zinner MJ, Studdert DM, et al. Analysis of errors
reported by surgeons at three teaching hospitals. Surgery
2003;133:614.
19. Lübbeke A, Hovaguimian F, Wickboldt N, et al. Effectiveness of the
surgical safety checklist in a high standard care environment. Med
Care 2013;51:425–9.
20. Hales BM, Pronovost PJ. The checklist: a tool for error management
and performance improvement. J Crit Care 2006;21:231–5.
21. De Vries EN, Prins HA, Crolla RM, et al. Effect of a comprehensive
surgical safety system on patient outcomes. N Eng J Med
2010;363:1928–37.
22. De Vries EN, Eikens-Jansen MP, Hamersma AM, et al. Prevention
of surgical malpractice claims by use of a surgical safety checklist.
Ann Surg 2011;253:624.
8 van Schoten SM, Kop V, de Blok C, et al. BMJ Open 2014;4:e005075. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2014-005075
Open Access
group.bmj.com on February 28, 2018 - Published by http://bmjopen.bmj.com/Downloaded from 
23. De Vries EN, Prins HA, Bennink MC, et al. Nature and timing of
incidents intercepted by the SURPASS checklist in surgical patients.
BMJ Qual Saf 2012;21:503–8.
24. DeFontes J, Surbida S. Preoperative safety briefing project. Perm J
2004;8:21–7.
25. Nederlandse Vereniging voor Anesthesiologie, Nederlandse
Vereniging voor Heelkunde. Richtlijn: Het peroperatieve traject, 2011.
26. VMS Safety Program. Prevention of wrong surgery. 2009. http://
www.vmszorg.nl
27. Joint commission. Lessons learned: wrong site surgery. 28 August
1998. http://www.jointcommissioninternational.org
28. MediRisk. OK-project: Schadecategoriën en vangnetcriteria voor de
operatieafdeling. 2007.
29. De Blok C, Koster E, Schilp J, et al. Implementatie VMS
Veiligheidsprogramma. Evaluatieonderzoek in Nederlandse
Ziekenhuizen. (In Dutch). Utrecht/Amsterdam: NIVEL en EMGO+
Instituut, 2013.
30. Twisk JW. Applied multilevel analysis: a practical guide. Cambridge
University Press, 2006.
31. Spence J, Goodwin B, Enns C, et al. Student-observed surgical
safety practices across an urban regional health authority. BMJ Qual
Saf 2011;20:580–6.
32. Altpeter T, Luckhardt K, Lewis JN, et al. Expanded surgical time out:
a key to real-time data collection and quality improvement. J Am Coll
Surg 2007;204:527–32.
33. Borchard A, Schwappach DL, Barbir A, et al. A systematic review of
the effectiveness, compliance, and critical factors for implementation
of safety checklists in surgery. Ann Surg 2012;256:925–33.
34. Dijkstra R, Wensing M, Thomas R, et al. The relationship between
organisational characteristics and the effects of clinical guidelines on
medical performance in hospitals, a meta-analysis. BMC Health
Serv Res 2006;6:53.
35. Nevis EC, DiBella AJ, Gould JM. Understanding organizations as
learning systems. Sloan Manage Rev 1997;36:73–85.
36. Zuiderent-Jerak T, Kool T, Rademakers J. De relatie tussen volume
en kwaliteit van zorg: tijd voor een brede benadering. 2012. Utrecht,
Nijmegen, Rotterdam; Consortium Onderzoek Kwaliteit van Zorg,
2012:135.
37. Mutter RL, Wong HS, Goldfarb MG. The effects of hospital
competition on inpatient quality of care. Inquiry 2008;45:263–79.
38. Sari N. Do competition and managed care improve quality? Health
Econ 2002;11:571–84.
39. Soria-Aledo V, Da Silva ZA, Saturno PJ, et al. Difficulties in
implementing a surgical check list in operating theatres. Cir Esp
2012;90:180.
40. De Vries EN, Hollmann MW, Smorenburg SM, et al. Development
and validation of the SURgical PAtient Safety System (SURPASS)
checklist. Qual Saf Health Care 2009;18:121–6.
41. Blanco M, Clarke JR, Martindell D. Wrong site surgery near misses
and actual occurrences. AORN J 2009;90:215–22.
van Schoten SM, Kop V, de Blok C, et al. BMJ Open 2014;4:e005075. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2014-005075 9
Open Access
group.bmj.com on February 28, 2018 - Published by http://bmjopen.bmj.com/Downloaded from 
programme in the Netherlands
hospitals: results of a national patient safety
intended to prevent wrong surgery in 
Compliance with a time-out procedure
Spreeuwenberg, Peter P Groenewegen and Cordula Wagner
Steffie M van Schoten, Veerle Kop, Carolien de Blok, Peter
doi: 10.1136/bmjopen-2014-005075
2014 4: BMJ Open
 http://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/4/7/e005075




This article cites 30 articles, 4 of which you can access for free at: 
Open Access
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/non-commercial. See: 
provided the original work is properly cited and the use is
non-commercially, and license their derivative works on different terms, 
permits others to distribute, remix, adapt, build upon this work
Commons Attribution Non Commercial (CC BY-NC 3.0) license, which 
This is an Open Access article distributed in accordance with the Creative
service
Email alerting
box at the top right corner of the online article. 
Receive free email alerts when new articles cite this article. Sign up in the
Collections





To request permissions go to:
http://journals.bmj.com/cgi/reprintform
To order reprints go to:
http://group.bmj.com/subscribe/
To subscribe to BMJ go to:
group.bmj.com on February 28, 2018 - Published by http://bmjopen.bmj.com/Downloaded from 
